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    The prospect of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of 
OSCE was controversial due to the country’s poor 
human rights record. None of the parliamentary 
or  presidential  elections  conducted  over  the  last 
decade was assessed as “free and fair” by the OSCE 
observers. The problematic situation with freedom 
of assembly, freedom of association and restrictions 
on media raised serious doubts whether the country 
was fit to chair the organization. Besides, there were 
concerns that Kazakhstan could become a “Trojan 
horse” and use its OSCE chairmanship to promote 
the  agenda  of  a  number  of  states  (first  of  all, 
Russia) unhappy with what they see as unbalanced 
and biased activities of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR).     
   To dissipate these doubts,  in November 2007 at the 
OSCE ministerial meeting in Madrid, Kazakhstan’s 
foreign  minister  Marat  Tajin  made  promises  to 
protect the current mandate of ODIHR and push 
ahead  with  political  modernization  by  amending 
legislation  on  elections,  political  parties,  media 
and  self-governance.  These  commitments  helped 
Kazakhstan  to  receive  the  2010  chairmanship. 
One  year  later,  Kazakhstan’s  Parliament  passed 
the  amendments  to  the  laws  on  elections, 
political  parties,  media,  and  self-governance. 
     Political parties, NGOs and media representatives 
were  disappointed  by  the  amendments  and 
criticized them as “cosmetic” and failing to meet 
the commitments made by Kazakhstan to OSCE. 
The party registration procedure was modified but 
the government retained freedom of maneuver. The 
number of members necessary for registration was 
brought down from 50,000 to 40,000 (600 in each 
province and the cities of Almaty and Astana). The 
7% barrier necessary to get seats in the Parliament 
was not lowered (opposition parties were proposing 
a 3% barrier), but a mechanism was created to let 
the second party into the Parliament in case only one 
party overcomes it. In a similar way, the amended 
law on media contained only minor improvements, 
and law on self-governance did not provide for any 
autonomous body from the state government system.
   In 2009 the political reform record has been 
mixed  at  best.  The  government  adopted  the National  Human  Rights  Action  Plan  for  2009-
2012, developed with the help of UNDP, which 
gives hope for improvements in a number of key 
areas including freedom of assembly and freedom 
of association; the Legal Policy Concept for 2010-
2020  focusing  on  judicial  reform,  criminal  and 
administrative justice, and law-enforcement bodies 
practices  and  powers;  and  the  Path  to  Europe 
program that aims at approximating Kazakhstani 
technical, environmental, social welfare and political 
standards  to  European  ones.  The  Parliament 
passed the laws on gender equality and on refugees 
(the  latter  had  been  «shelved»  for  many  years). 
The same year the Government prepared and the 
Parliament  adopted  the  law  on  information  and 
communication  networks  and  law  on  protection 
of privacy, criticized by journalists, human rights 
activists  and  opposition  parties  for  limiting 
freedom  of  the  Internet  and  traditional  media 
(the EU made a statement expressing regret and 
emphasizing  that  it  violates  Kazakhstan’s  OSCE 
commitments).  Overall,  independent  media  have 
been  under  attack.  Major  opposition  newspapers 
Respublika  and  Taszhargan  lost  “defamation” 
cases  in  court  and  were  forced  to  close  down.   
    Another worrying trend in the political life of 
the country has been the growing personality cult. 
The university named after President Nazarbayev 
(Nazarbayev University) to open in 2010 and his 
bronze statue mounted in Astana broke the previous 
informal  ban  on  such  venerations.  In  September 
deputy  chairman  of  the  ruling  Nur  Otan  party 
(Nur being a reference to Nazarbayev’s first name 
Nursultan) proposed adopting a law on the national 
leader  that  would  make  Nazarbayev  life-long 
president.1 The initiative triggered controversy among 
pro-presidential  forces  and      predictably    caused 
strong  negative  reaction  among  the  opposition. 
    Overall,  the  current  political  landscape  in 
Kazakhstan cannot bring satisfaction to those who 
hoped  that  the  upcoming  chairmanship  would 
stimulate political reforms. Changes were minimal 
and introduced minor improvements, while bigger 
1 It should be noted that the 2007 constitutional amendment 
already allows Nazarbayev as the first president run for more 
than two terms.
ones  (like  those  contained  in  the  Human  Rights 
Action Plan) remain at the level of promises. In 
areas where the regime felt threatened, it did not 
hesitate to adopt measures that are in breach with 
Kazakhstan’s OSCE commitments. It is defensive 
with the regard to outside challenges, and there are 
signs that it is undergoing an internal crisis. Influential 
groups struggle for power, which is expressed in 
the ongoing “war” among law-enforcement bodies 
(interior  ministry,  financial  police  and  security 
services)  and  arrests  of  a  number  of  prominent 
officials and executives. As a result, the bureaucratic 
and business communities are demoralized. At the 
same time, the protest potential is growing due to 
the economic crisis, but the government is too inept 
to  deal  with  the  challenge,  while  the  opposition 
parties are too weak and lacking institutionalized 
channels for this energy to offer viable alternatives. 
     Thus, on the eve of its chairmanship, Kazakhstan 
seems  to  be  entering  a  systemic  crisis.  The  old 
development  paradigm  does  not  work  anymore. 
Internal  problems  have  accumulated  and  are 
challenging the current status quo. How will that 
affect the country’s performance in OSCE?  It is 
likely that the gap between how Kazakhstan wants 
to present itself and reality will be growing and more 
difficult to conceal. Considering also the geopolitical 
factor, that it will continue to be pulled in different 
directions by different actors (Russia, EU, US), it is 
reasonable to expect that the year 2010 is going to 
be difficult both for Kazakhstan and OSCE at large. 